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PART II 
Public Law 
CHAPTER 11 
Constitutional Law 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
During the 1955 SURVEY year the Supreme Judicial Court disposed 
of cases involving a wide array of constitutional issues. It announced 
revolutionary doctrines in the field of land use regulation and in that 
of motion picture censorship. In addition, the Court was called upon 
to adjudicate problems of a more conventional type. 
As in the past, not all the constitutional developments of the SURVEY 
year are discussed in this chapter, but some of them are examined in 
other chapters, where the cases mentioned involve issues to which con-
stitutional problems are but incidental. 
§ll.l. Freedom of expression: Film censorship. In two landmark 
decisions on July 6, 1955, advance censorship of motion picture films 
appears to be outlawed. 
In Brattle Films) Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Safety! plaintiff 
theater brought a petition for a binding declaration as to its right to 
exhibit, on Sunday, a certain film which the Commissioner of Public 
Safety had refused to approve, and which, for that reason, could not 
be exhibited on Sunday under the terms of the statute.2 Although the 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR., is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. He is a 
member of the Bars of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of the members of the 
Board of Student Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY, especially Robert J. Sherer and 
John H. Doermann. 
§11.1. ! 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 809, 127 N.E.2d 891. 
2 G.L., c. 136, §4: "[The] mayor of a city ... may, upon written application 
describing the proposed entertainment, grant, upon such terms or conditions as 
... [he] may prescribe, a license to hold on the Lord's Day a public entertainment, 
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plaintiff's bill, in addition to alleging that the refusal of the approval 
and license required by the statute was unconstitutional, alleged that 
the film in question was "not of such a character as to disturb the peace 
and quiet of the Lord's Day or to interfere with its due observance," 3 
the Court did not pause to inquire whether the Commissioner had 
misused his statutory authority. Instead, the Court proceeded di-
rectly to the constitutional issue tendered by the plaintiff, and held 
that the licensing statute is "void on its face as a prior restraint on the 
freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments [of the Constitution of the United States]." 4 
The Court reached this conclusion upon the authority of the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Joseph Burstyn, 
Inc. v. Wilson. 5 There, the Court invalidated the action of a state 
agency which rescinded the license of an exhibitor for exhibition of a 
certain film on the ground that the film was "sacrilegious" within the 
meaning of the pertinent statute. The scope of the principle which 
the Court found applicable in that case is, however, far from clear. 
Justice Clark, in writing the opinion of the Supreme Court, an-
nounced that motion pictures, as well as older methods of expression, 
are included within the constitutional protection of free speech and 
press.6 The opinion relied upon Near v. Minnesota ex rei. Olson7 as 
authority for a principle of constitutional prohibition of previous re-
straints on publication, to be departed from "only in exceptional 
cases." 8 The Court ruled that censorship under the statutory "sacri-
legious" standard did not present such an exceptional case.9 Left 
open, as unnecessary for decision, was the question, "for example, 
whether a state may censor motion pictures under a clearly drawn 
statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene 
films." 10 
Since the Burstyn decision, in 1952, the Supreme Court has failed 
to clarify its doctrine. Several state courts have sustained film censor-
ship statutes upon the ground that they are "clearly" or "narrowly" 
drawn enactments within the possible exception left open by Justice 
Clark's opinion in Burstyn. The Supreme Court has, in each in-
in keeping with the character of the day and not inconsistent with its due ob-
servance ... provided, that no such license shall ... have effect unless the pro-
posed entertainment shall ... have been approved in writing by the commissioner 
of public safety as being in keeping with the character of the day and not incon-
sistent with its due observance." 
3 Record, p. 2, par. 7. Note the difference between this language and that of 
the statute, note 2 supra. 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 8Il, 127 N.E.2d at 892. 
5343 U.S. 495, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 96 L. Ed. 1098 (1952). 
6343 U.S. at 502, 72 Sup. Ct. at 780·781, 96 L. Ed. at 1106 (1952). 
7283 U.S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1930). 
8343 U.S. at 503·504, 72 Sup. Ct. at 780-781, 96 L. Ed. at Il06-Il07 (1952). 
9343 U.S. at 504-505, 72 Sup. Ct. at 782, 96 L. Ed. at Il07 (1952). 
10 343 U.S. at 505-506, 72 Sup. Ct. at 782-783, 96 L. Ed. at ll08 (1952). 
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stance,ll reversed by per curiam memorandum, citing only the Burstyn 
case and Superior Films v. Department of Education,12 which was itself 
a per curiam reversal, citing only Burstyn. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in the Brattle Films case, appears to 
have concluded that the course of decision in the Supreme Court is in-
dicative of an attitude which would not tolerate previous censorhip of 
motion pictures under any standard. Thus, the Court found it un-
necessary to decide whether the standards set up in the statute for the 
guidance of the Commissioner were so indefinite as to render the stat-
ute void for want of due process.13 
The Court made two possibly important qualifications of the con-
stitutional doctrine it announced in the Brattle Films case. First, it 
found it unnecessary to discuss the significance of the provisions of 
the Massachusetts Constitution14 with respect to freedom of expres-
sion.15 Thus, it will be possible, in the event that the Supreme Court 
of the United States should recede from its apparently adamant pres-
ent position against film censorship, to keep the law of Massachusetts 
as stated in the Brattle Films case.16 Second, the companion case, 
Times Film Corp. v. Commissioner of Public Safetyp contains lan-
guage which may substantially qualify the breadth of the constitu-
tional objection to film censorship. In that case, which was a petition 
for certiorari to quash the Commissioner's refusal to approve certain 
films for exhibition on Sunday, the Court said: "In the Brattle Films 
case we have decided that §4 is unconstitutional as applied to the 
facts in that case." 18 (Emphasis supplied.) That, of course, is not 
what was said in the Brattle Films opinion, which stated that Section 4 
"is void on its face." 19 The quoted language in the Times Film opin-
ion may mean simply that Section 4 is invalid as applied to films, con-
sidered apart from other entertainments covered by the statute. On 
the other hand, it may imply that another censoring law, with differ-
11 Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 177 Kan. 728, 282 P.2d 412 (1955), rev'd, 
350 u.s. 870, 76 Sup. Ct. 117, 100 L. Ed. Adv. 73 (1955); Commercial Pictures Corp. v. 
Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953), rev'd, 346 U.S. 587, 74 Sup. Ct. 286, 
98 L. Ed. 329 (1954); Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 159 Ohio St. 
315, 112 N.E.2d 311 (1953), rev'd, 346 U.S. 587, 74 Sup. Ct. 286, 98 L. Ed. 329 (1954). 
The Illinois statute, manifestly intended to be "narrowly drawn" and "definite," was 
sustained by the state court in American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 
Ill. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954), appeal dismissed "for want of a final judgment," 
348 U.S. 979, 75 Sup. Ct. 572, 99 L. Ed. 763 (1955). 
12 Note 11 supra. In this case Justices Douglas and Black concurred specially, 
contending that all previous censorship is forbidden by the Constitution. 
131955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 812, 127 N.E.2d at 893. 
14 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. XVI, as amended by Amend. Art. 
LXXVII. 
15 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 812, 127 N.E.2d at 893. 
16 See Lowell Gas Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 324 Mass. 80, 84 N.E.2d 
811 (1949). 
171955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 813, 127 N.E.2d 893. 
181955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 814, 127 N.E.2d at 893. 
191955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 811, 127 N.E.2d at 892. 
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ent standards for the guidance of the censor, would be consistent with 
constitutional requirements. 
The cases cited indicate that judicial (and perhaps legislative) 
thinking on the matter of film censorship has been in terms of previ-
ous restraints or immunity therefrom, of sufficiency or insufficiency of 
the statutory standards. Justice Frankfurter, however, has suggested, 
although he did not pause for definitive exposition, a more discrete, if 
somewhat mystical, approach to the problem of censorship.20 This 
suggestion may have significance, since thoughts expressed in Frank-
furter concurrences have been known in the past to emerge finally as 
the law of the Supreme Court.21 
§l1.2. Standing to raise issues of constitutionality. In two cases 
the Court announced the existence of a doctrine which had never be-
fore been explicitly stated to be applicable in Massachusetts.1 It ruled 
that public offlcers who had no personal stake in the matter in con-
troversy would not be heard to question the constitutional validity of 
a relevant statute. 
In Assessors of Haverhill v. New England Telephone & Telegraph 
CO.,2 the board of assessors appealed from an Appellate Tax Board de-
cision granting the telephone company an abatement of the tax as-
sessed upon a valuation determined by the assessors. The statute then 
in force3 provided that the assessment on the property of a telephone 
company should be upon the valuation certified to the local assessors 
by the state Tax Commissioner. The assessors might appeal from the 
20 "Arguments by the parties and in briefs amici invite us to pursue to their 
farthest reach the problems in which this case is involved. Positions are advanced 
so absolute and abstract that in any event they could not properly determine this 
controversy. . . . We are asked to decide this case by choosing between two mutually 
exclusive alternatives: that motion pictures may be subjected to unrestricted censor-
ship, or that they must be allowed to be shown under any circumstances. But only 
the tyranny of absolutes would rely on such alternatives to meet the problems gen-
erated by the need to accommodate the diverse interests affected by the motion 
pictures in compact modern communities. It would startle Madison and Jefferson 
and George Mason, could they adjust themselves to our day, to be told that the 
freedom of speech which they espoused in the Bill of Rights authorizes a showing 
of 'The Miracle' from windows facing St. Patrick's Cathedral in the forenoon of 
Easter Sunday, just as it would startle them to be told that any picture, whatever its 
theme and expression, could be barred from being commercially exhibited. The 
general principle of free speech, expressed in the First Amendment as to encroach-
ments by Congress, and included as it is in the Fourteenth Amendment, binding on 
the States, must be placed in its historical and legal contexts. The Constitution, we 
cannot recall too often, is an organism, not merely a literary composition." Con-
curring opinion, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 518-519, 72 Sup. Ct. 
777,783,96 L. Ed. 1098, ll08 (1955). 
21 Compare the concurring opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59, 67 
Sup. Ct. 1672, 1679, 91 L. Ed. 1903, 1912 (1947), with the opinions of the Court in 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,69 Sup. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949), and Rochin 
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 Sup. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952). 
§11.2. 1 See discussion in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.1. 
2332 Mass. 357, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245, 124 N.E.2d 917. 
S G.L., c. 59, §39, as enacted by Acts of 1939, c. 451, §22. 
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certification to the Appellate Tax Board.4 Once the tax was assessed 
the company might apply to the state Tax Commissioner for abate-
ment, and, in the event he refused, might appeal to the Appellate Tax 
Board.5 In the event of an abatement, however, the assessors had no 
right of appeal. 
The assessors, in the case, did not appeal to the Commissioner from 
his certification of the valuation of the company's property, but, in-
stead, assessed on the basis of their own independent valuation. After 
the Appellate Tax Board granted the abatement, the assessors based 
their appeal upon the contention that the statutes which gave the state 
Tax Commissioner a part in the assessing process violated the state and 
federal Constitutions. 
The Court fully considered the contentions, and rejected them, 
point by point. It ruled that there was no violation of the state con-
stitutional requirement6 that taxes be proportional and reasonable 
where the valuation of some property is made by the assessors, while 
that of other property is made by the Commissioner. The constitu-
tional standard is met, ruled the Court, when the valuation criterion 
applicable to both classes of property is the same. Likewise, there was 
no invalid delegation of power to the Commissioner. Since the power 
to determine values must be vested in someone, there is no greater 
delegation problem when that power is placed in the Commissioner 
than when it is placed in the assessors. Again, there is no denial of 
due process or of equal protection in giving the taxpayer an appeal 
from the Commissioner's denial of an abatement while not giving the 
assessors an appeal from his allowance of one. The right of public 
officers to appeal is completely within the discretion of the legislature. 
Finally, there is no denial of equal protection in provision for valua-
tion of telephone companies' property by the Commissioner, and for 
valuation of the property of other utility companies by the local as-
sessors. "Sufficient ground for valid classification is found in the dif-
fering nature of the services rendered and of the means employed in 
rendering them." 7 
After disposing, in rather fully documented detail, of the assessors' 
contentions on their merits, the Court, anticlimactically, indicated 
that it need not have reached the merits at all. Only persons who are 
adversely affected by an unconstitutional statute may have the ques-
tion of constitutionality adjudicated. Since the assessors have no per-
sonal or property rights of their own involved in the litigation, their 
appeal, which was based solely on constitutional grounds, must fail. 
In the second case, Quinn v. School Committee of Plymouth,S the 
Court was more abrupt in disposing of the constitutional contention. 
4 Ibid. 
5 G.L.. c. 59. §73. as enacted by Acts of 1939. c. 451. §44. 
6 Mass. Const.. Part II. c. 1. §1. Art. IV. 
71955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 248. 124 N.E.2d at 920. 
8332 Mass. 410. 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 303. 125 N.E.2d 410. 
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The plaintiffs there sought mandamus to compel the school committee 
to furnish transportation such as was furnished to children attending 
public schools to the children of the plaintiffs who were attending pri-
vate schools at which denominational doctrine was taught. One de· 
fense of the school committee was that the statuteD requiring transpor-
tation of pupils to schools where religious instruction is provided to 
the same extent that transportation is provided for pupils to public 
schools was unconstitutional. The Court refused to consider the 
merits of the contention. Citing the Haverhill case, it said, "The com· 
mittee in this proceeding cannot question the constitutionality of [the 
statute]." 10 
The principle that, in generalP executive or administrative officers 
should not be heard to question the constitutionality of legislative acts 
appears sound, and is supported by the authorities, many of which are 
collected in the opinion in the Haverhill case. As a matter of judicial 
technique it would seem preferable to follow the pattern set in the 
Quinn case, and refuse to consider the merits of a constitutional issue 
tendered by a party without standing to raise the issue. It is usually 
the part of wisdom for courts not to resolve constitutional issues in ad-
vance of the necessity therefor. There might also be a question of the 
propriety of deciding an issue one side of which has been presented by 
a party with no standing to present it. Resolution of the issue may be 
unduly prejudicial to parties who may have proper standing to pre-
sent it in other cases. 
§1l.3. Jurisdiction to try prisoner in federal custody. One of the 
points raised by two of the defendants in Commonwealth v. Domanski 1 
was that the state court had no jurisdiction to try them for assault 
with intent to rob and related offenses because, at the time of the trial, 
they were in custody of a United States marshal awaiting trial in the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on in· 
dictments for federal offenses. They were produced by the marshal in 
the Superior Court in response to a writ of habeas corpus ad re-
spondendum. An Assistant United States Attorney informed the 
court after the conviction of the defendants that the United States 
had no objecion to their being sentenced, provided that they would 
be made available to answer to the pending federal charges. 
The Supreme Judicial Court pointed out that the law is well settled 
to the contrary of the defendants' contention. While it is clear that a 
state court cannot, by writ of habeas corpus or otherwise, acquire juris-
diction of a prisoner already in federal custody for the purpose of oust-
9 C.L.. c. 76, §l. 
10 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 306, 125 N.E.2d at 413. 
11 In the Haverhill case the Court recognized the danger of laying down com-
pletely absolute propositions, and left room for possible extraordinary cases: "If 
there are exceptions to this principle, there is no reason for counting this case 
among them." 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245, 249, 124 N.E.2d 917. 921. 
§11.3. 1332 Mass. 66, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 935, 123 N.E.2d 368. 
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ing a federal court of jurisdiction,2 it is equally clear that the United 
States may consent to the acquisition of jurisdiction by the state, and 
may surrender the prisoner for that purpose. This was established in 
Ponzi v. Fessenden,s and has been reiterated in subsequent cases which 
are cited in the Domanski opinion. 
Intergovernmental cooperation in cases such as this may be carried 
to great lengths. A striking instance was seen in the case of Gerald 
Chapman, the notorious robber of a generation ago. Chapman had 
been convicted in a federal court of mail robbery and was in the At-
lanta Penitentiary serving a 25-year term. When he was indicted in 
Connecticut for murder, the Attorney General transferred him to a 
prison in that state and subsequently surrendered him, on a "friendly" 
writ of habeas corpus, into the custody of the state court for triaL 
After his conviction and unsuccessful appeal, President Coolidge 
signed a document commuting his federal sentence to the time al-
ready served. Chapman "refused to accept" the commutation, but 
both the District Court for the District of Connecticut4 and the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit5 ruled that this was immate-
rial, and Chapman was led forth to be hanged pursuant to the judg-
ment of the state court. The courts pointed out, as does the Court in 
the instant case,6 that the United States is the only party whose rights 
can be said to be involved, so that, if the United States does not see fit 
to assert its superior jurisdiction, the prisoner is in no position to raise 
the question. 
§llA. Free exercise of religion. Gordon v. Gordon1 involved the 
will of Joseph Gordon, an Orthodox Jew. He died leaving several 
children, and in his will he made gifts to each of them. The will went 
on to recite that, "If any of my said children shall marry a person not 
born in the Hebrew faith," the gift to such child should be revoked 
and the interest of such child should pass to the other children. Six 
years after the father's death, one of the sons married a woman who 
had been born to Catholic parents and who practiced the Catholic 
faith until shortly before her marriage. She undertook religious in-
struction under rabbis, and, some six months after her marriage, she 
became a formal convert to Judaism. The Court ruled that the son's 
marriage worked a revocation of his rights under the father's will, and 
that his share of the father's estate passed, under the will, to the other 
children of the testator. 
2 Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 16 L. Ed. 169 (U.S. 1858). 
3258 U.S. 254, 42 Sup. Ct. 309, 66 L. Ed. 607 (1921). 
4 Chapman v. Scott, 10 F.2d 156 (D. Conn. 1925). 
5 Chapman v. Scott, 10 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1925). 
61954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 940, 123 N.E.2d at 372-373. 
§11.4. 1332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955). 
In a companion case, Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 210, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955), cert. 
denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955), the son was removed as fiduciary under the father's 
will because of his marriage. 
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One of the principal contentions advanced for the son was that ju-
dicial enforcement of the forfeiture provision of the will was forbidden 
by the constitutional guaranties of freedom of religion. It was argued 
that the case was analogous to Shelley v. Kraemer,2 where it was held 
that judicial enforcement of a racial restriction in a conveyance of real 
estate would constitute official discrimination of a sort forbidden by 
the Constitution, although the parties to the restriction agreement, be-
ing private individuals, are not subject to the inhibitions of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court refused to concede that the analogy existed, saying that 
the cases cited in support of the argument "seem to us to involve quite 
different considerations from the right to dispose of property by 
will." 3 
Although the doctrine that courts, as well as other departments of 
state governments, are bound by constitutional limitations found in 
the Fourteenth Amendment is not new,4 its application has been 
limited to cases where judicial officers were involved in unfair proce-
dures in violation of the Due Process Clause,5 or were made partici-
pants in discriminatory practices in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.6 In the latter type of case there is uncertainty as to how far 
the constitutional prohibitions are applicable to judicial action.7 
To extend the area of constitutional inhibitions of judicial conduct 
so as to prohibit any impact of judicial decrees upon religion would 
be to invite some startling problems. Thus, a logical corrolary of the 
contention which was rejected in the Gordon case might be that courts 
are constitutionally forbidden to enforce legacies to churches because 
2344 u.S. 1,68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1175 (1948). 
31955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 65, 124 N.E.2d at 235. 
4 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676 (1880). 
5 See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 u.S. 86, 43 Sup. Ct. 265, 67 L. Ed. 543 (1923). 
There are cases, such as Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct. 190, 86 L. 
Ed. 192 (1941), where judicial action was stricken down in the name of the consti-
tutional guaranties of free speech and press, but those were cases where the courts 
in question were proceeding for contempt. These cases are thus more nearly akin 
to those in which a court is rebuked for failure to provide a fair trial than to those 
in which the objectionable thing is the court's cooperation with some private indi-
vidual or group for the achievement of a result which the Constitution forbids. 
6 Shelley v. Kraemer, 344 u.s. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1175 (1948); Barrows 
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 Sup. Ct. 1031, 98 L. Ed. 361 (1953). 
7 Although, as to racial restrictions in deeds, the Supreme Court has refused, on 
constitutional grounds, to permit injunctions for their enforcement (Shelley v. 
Kraemer, note 6 supra) or damages for their breach (Barrows v. Jackson, note 6 
supra), a racial restriction in a deed was successfully used as a defense to a damage 
action. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 
(1954), atJ'd by an evenly divided court, 348 u.S. 880, 75 Sup. Ct. 614, 99 L. Ed. 897 
(1954). On rehearing, the Supreme Court successfully masked its views on the merits 
of the question by granting the rehearing and dismissing the writ of certiorari on 
the ground that it had been improvidently granted. 349 u.S. 70, 75 Sup. Ct. 614, 
99 L. Ed. 897 (1954). 
8
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such enforcement would constitute an establishment of religion.8 It 
seems the part of wisdom to avoid extension of constitutional prohibi-
tions into such an area, at least until the implications of such an ex-
tension are carefully assessed. 
§11.5. Pricing-control legislation. Fournier v. Troianell0 1 rejected 
a challenge of the validity of the "Unfair Sales Law" 2 which forbids 
retailers to sell below "cost," as defined in the statute, "with intent to 
injure competitors or destroy competition." The term "cost" is de-
fined in the law3 as invoice cost, less trade discounts except customary 
discounts for cash, plus (I) freight charges not otherwise included in 
the cost, (2) cartage to the retail outlet if performed or paid for by 
the retailer, which is deemed to be % of 1 percent of the cost unless 
a lower cartage cost can be shown, and (3) a markup "to cover in part 
the cost of doing business" of 6 percent of the total cost at the retail 
outlet, unless it can be shown that the cost of doing business was 
lower. 
The plaintiff grocer complained that the defendant grocer had ad-
vertised for sale at 15 cents, loaves of bread for which his distributor 
had charged him 17 cents, and which the plaintiff regularly sold at 20 
cents. 
The Supreme Judicial Court disposed summarily of the defendant's 
contentions that the statute was unconstitutional. It simply did not 
"agree that the prohibition relating to advertising to sell below cost is 
too vague to be enforced." Nor did it feel that the defendant was de-
prived of "equal and natural rights to engage in commerce for profit." 
For the latter proposition the Court cited Merit Oil Co. v. Director, 
Division on the Necessaries of Life,4 to the effect that the legislature, 
in the exercise of its·police power, may regulate, and even prohibit, the 
advertising of goods and prices. 
The case does not appear to have presented for the Court's consid-
eration some of the knottier problems which have been raised else-
where in connection with this type of legislation. Some courts have 
found constitutional defects in statutes (particularly those which carry 
criminal sanctions)5 prohibiting sales below cost without reference to 
8 See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 
(1947); Illinois ex reI. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 Sup. Ct. 
461, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948), where the "Establishment" Clause of the First Amendment, 
included within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, was read as forbidding 
"laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." 
But see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 Sup. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. 609 (1952). 
§11.5. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 597, 127 N.E.2d 167. 
2 G.L., c. 93, §§14E-14K. 
3 Id. § 14E(a). 
4319 Mass. 301, 65 N.E.2d 529 (1946). 
5 The usual pattern of sales-below-cost statutes is to provide for enforcement by 
criminal prosecution as well as by civil suit by an interested party. 
9
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the effect of such sales upon competition.6 Such courts have been 
disturbed by the vague standards which they have perceived in the 
statutory definition of "cost," and particularly in the provisions which 
relate the cost of doing business to the invoice cost of goods. These 
objections, however, tend to disappear when the prohibition of sales 
below cost is linked with an intent to injure competitors or impair or 
\..\ destroy competition.7 Another kind of constitutional issue is pre-
.)Sented in the practical application of the statute. Section 14F pro-
vides that evidence of a sale below cost is prima facie evidence of in-
tent to injure competitors or destroy competition. As a practical mat-
ter, it is next to impossible to present evidence in rebuttal of such a 
conclusion, as the statutory prohibition is manifestly made without 
reference to a specific subjective intent to injure or destroy, and actual 
injury or destruction is not a necessary ingredient of a violation of the 
statute. Courts have thus been required to face (and they have done 
so with varying results)8 the objection that the statute violates due 
process rights by unreasonably establishing a conclusive presumption.9 
During the 1955 SURVEY year the Court declined to consider the va-
lidity of the somewhat related, but entirely different, "Fair Trade 
Law." 10 This statute, which permits trade-mark owners to control the 
resale prices of their products in the hands of distributors, poses con-
stitutional problems with respect to delegation of powers, due process 
in the limitation of the distributor's right to engage in price competi-
tion, and, where the subject affects interstate commerce (as it usually 
does), complex relations between state law and the federal antitrust 
laws. In Bond Liquor Store, Inc. v. Moriartyll the Court dismissed, 
6 Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore Candy Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A.2d 201 
(1940); Lief v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N.J.L. 180,8 A.2d 291 (1939); Common-
wealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67, 128 A.L.R. 1120 (1940). 
7 Wholesale Tobacco Dealers v. National Candy Co., II Cal. 2d 634, 82 P.2d 3 
(1938); McElhorne v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414 (1940); Associated Mer-
chants v. Ormesher, 107 Mont. 530, 86 P.2d 1031 (1939); McIntire v. Borofsky, 
95 N.H. 174,59 A.2d 471 (1948); Lane Distributors v. Tilton, 7 N.J.L. 349, 81 A.2d 
786 (1951); Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565; 113 S.W.2d 733 (1938); State v. Langley, 53 
Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938). Contra: Standard Store v. Safeway Stores, CCH 1955 
Trade Cases ~68,153 (Colo. Dist. Ct.). 
8 Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. 1938); People v. Pay 
Less Drug Co., 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d 9 (1944). 
9 Other constitutional problems sometimes grow out of alleged unequal treatment 
of various constituent segments of the commercial structure for distribution of 
goods. See, e.g., Cohen v. Frey & Son, 197 Md. 586, 80 A.2d 267 (1951); Lane Dis-
tributors v. Tilton, 7 N.J.L. 349, 81 A.2d 786 (1951); Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 
148 Ohio St. 519, 76 N.E.2d 91 (1947). For a comprehensive survey of the legal and 
legal-economic problems involved in the sales-below-cost statutes, see Lovell, Sales 
Below Cost Prohibitions: Private Price Fixing under State Law, 57 Yale L.J. 391 
(1948). 
10 G.L., c. 93, §§14A-14D. The basic difference between the fair trade laws and 
the unfair sales laws are summarized in Federal Trade Commission, Report on Re-
sale Price Maintenance 847-849 (1945). 
11 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 525, 126 N.E.2d 362. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1955 [1955], Art. 15
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1955/iss1/15
I 
§11.6 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 113 
for want of jurisdiction, a report by a Superior Court justice of a peti-
tion for certiorari in which the validity of the Fair Trade Law was 
challenged. The court pointed out that there is no statutory provi-
sion for reporting, without decision, a petition for certiorari, which is, 
in this respect, unlike a bill in equity. 
§11.6. Land use regulation. Two advisory opinionsl were the 
vehicles by which the Court announced its departure from a well-
settled doctrine of limitation upon legislative power. The legislature 
had under consideration two bills which would have constituted cer-
tain parts of Nantucket, and of Beacon Hill in Boston, "historic dis-
tricts." 2 The areas within the boundaries of these districts would 
have been subjected to public control with respect to the demolition 
of existing buildings or the making of architectural changes of the ex-
teriors of such buildings, with a general view to the preservation of 
buildings and neighborhoods of historic interest. In imposing these 
restrictions without compensation to the owners of the property sub-
jected to the regulations it is obvious, as the Court noted, that the bills 
were not related, in the conventional sense, to public safety, health, or 
morals. 
When the constitutionality of land use regulations, classically exem-
plified by zoning laws, has been before the courts, the traditional ju-
dicial approach has been to sustain the regulations on the rather 
strained ground that they tend to promote public safety by reducing 
the congestion of vehicular traffic,S or health by providing for open 
areas,4 or morals.5 Occasionally it has been recognized that an addi-
tional (but only an additional) justification for such laws might be 
that they promote aesthetic values in the community.6 
In rendering its advisory opinions on the historic districts bills, the 
Court threw off the shackles of these earlier views and ruled that there 
would be no general constitutional objection to them in that they did 
not perform the conventional function of promoting health, safety, or 
morals. The Justices recognized that, in the present day and age, the 
preservation of imponderable values may be as proper a function of 
state police power as preservation of the more tangible things such as 
health and safety. 
§1l.6. 1 Opinion of the Justices. 1955 Adv. Sh. 823. 128 N.E.2d 557; Opinion of the 
Justices. 1955 Adv. Sh. 833. 128 N.E.2d 563. 
2 The Nantucket bill became Acts of 1955. c. 601. and the Beacon Hill bill became 
Acts of 1955. c. 616. 
3 See. e.g .• Welch v. Swasey. 193 Mass. 364. 79 N.E. 745 (1907). aU'd, 214 U.S. 81. 
29 Sup. Ct. 567. 53 L. Ed. 923 (1909). 
4 Euclid v. Amber Realty Co .• 272 U.S. 365. 47 Sup. Ct. 114. 71 L. Ed. 303.54 A.L.R. 
1016 (1926). 
5 See Cusack Co. v. Chicago. 242 U.S. 526. 37 Sup. Ct. 190. 61 L. Ed. 472. L.R.A. 
1918A 136. Ann. Cas. 1917C 594 (1917). 
6 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works. 289 Mass. 149. 
193 N.E. 799 (1935). appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543. 56 Sup. Ct. 95. 80 L. Ed. 385 
(1935). See Gardner. The Massachusetts Billboard Decision. 49 Harv. L. Rev. 869 
(1936). 
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Referring to the cases in which zoning and building regulations had 
been sustained because of a perceived relation to health and safety, 
the opinion in the Nantucket case recited: "It may be noted that 
those decisions and statements rested upon precedents that originated 
before the extensive restrictions upon the use of private property now 
familiar in zoning rules had met with general acceptance. There is 
reason to think that more weight might now be given to aesthetic con-
siderations than was given to them a half century ago." 7 
The Justices, however, made it clear that their approval of this new 
concept of the scope of police power was only to the extent that "in a 
general sense the proposed act would be an act for the promotion of 
the general welfare and would be constitutional. . ." 8 They reserved 
the power to consider the constitutional implications of application of 
the principles of the bills in particular cases.9 
§11.7. Tax concessiohs and public purpose in land planning. In 
marked contrast to the opinions on the historic district bills was an 
advisory opinion1 on a proposal for development of a vacant area in 
the city of Boston. 
The so-called Huntington Avenue Yard of the Boston & Albany 
Railroad, a tract of some twenty-eight acres, is no longer needed for 
railroad purposes, and is about to be disposed of. A legislative pro-
posal was made that the land be acquired, by eminent domain or 
otherwise, by the city of Boston through a Back Bay Development 
Commission. The land would then be sold, in a single parcel, to a 
corporation, which would undertake to develop it in accordance with 
a comprehensive plan to be approved by the commission. The plan 
would provide for streets, parks and other utilities, would include an 
auditorium and exhibition hall, and would provide for subdivision of 
the remaining land into lots for private uses subject to standards set 
forth in the bill. As an inducement to a prospective developer, the 
maximum valuation of the property for tax purposes was fixed at ap-
proximately 25 percent above the 1954 assessed value for the first five 
years of the life of the project. Thereafter, assessment valuation must 
not exceed three times the amount of the 1954 valuation unless the 
operating receipts of the corporation are sufficient, under a formula 
expressed in the bill, to pay the tax on a higher valuation. During the 
first forty-five years of the project there could be no foreclosure of the 
liens of any unpaid taxes, but any such liens would be preserved. 
The Justices ruled that the proposal was constitutionally defective. 
Their main objections were that (1) the tax benefits to the developer 
would oblige it to pay less than its share of the cost of government 
benefits, and (2) the condemnation of property and the expenditure 
71955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 828, 128 N.E.2d at 561. 
81955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 830, 128 N.E.2d at 562. 
9 See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 Sup. Ct. 447, 72 L. Ed. 842 (1928). 
§11.7. 1 Opinion of the Justices, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 541, 126 N.E.2d 795. 
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of public funds would not be for a public purpose in the light of the 
ultimate private uses of the land. 
The first ground of the opinion was that assessment-valuation con-
cessions and postponement of tax-lien foreclosures are per se in viola-
tion of the mandates of the state Constitution that taxes be equal 2 and 
"proportional and reasonable." 3 This result was reached without 
consideration of the possibility that the requirement that the devel-
oper furnish substantial public facilities might be regarded as a factor 
which would offset the relatively higher tax obligations of other land-
owners. Although the opinion intimated that these objections to the 
proposal might be eliminated by constitutional amendment,4 that pos-
sibility was rendered academic when the opinion pronounced that the 
proposed tax inequality would violate the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution.5 This con-
clusion was reached without specific consideration of the question 
whether there are sufficient differences between an unique project 
such as the proposed development and other property to warrant sepa-
rate classifications for tax purposes. 
The answer to the latter question is perhaps implicit in the second 
major ground of the opinion, that the taking of the land and the use of 
public funds therefor would not be for a public use. In this portion 
of the opinion the Justices, in effect, carried into execution the 
caveat which, the year before, they had announced in Papadinis v. 
Somerville. 6 There, after sustaining the Urban Redevelopment Law 
as a slum-clearance statute, the Court expressly reserved decision as to 
whether the law would be constitutional as applied to a "blighted 
open area." 7 The present opinion, applying the "public use" con-
cept set forth in Salisbury Land & Improvement Co. v. Common-
wealth,S rules that, where the area is not now a slum, and there is only 
apprehension lest it become one, public funds and the public power of 
eminent domain may not be used to prevent its future deterioration 
into a condition from which public funds and the public power of emi-
nent domain may have to be used to rescue it. 
In the Nantucket advisory opinion9 the Justices placed great reli-
2 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. X. 
3Id., Part II, c. 1, §l, Art. IV. 
41955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 551, 126 N.E.2d at 801. The Constitution has been 
amended in the past for the purpose of allaying doubts as to power to provide 
housing accommodations. Mass. Const. Amend. Arts. XLIII, XLVII. These were 
subsequently held to be unnecessary to authorize public bodies to engage in public 
housing projects which were incidental to slum clearance. Allydonn Realty Corp. 
v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939). 
51955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 551, 126 N.E.2d at 801. 
6331 Mass. 627, 121 N.E.2d 714 (1954). See discussion in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §13.2. 
7331 Mass. at 634, 121 N.E.2d at 718. 
s 215 Mass. 371, 102 N.E. 619 (1913). 
9 Opinion of the Justices, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 823, 128 N .E.2d 557. See §11.6 s.upra. 
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ance upon Berman v. Parker,1o in which the Supreme Court of the 
United States sustained the urban redevelopment statute of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. In the present opinion it is said that the principle 
upon which Berman v. Parker rests is not applicable. Yet, in writing 
the caveat in Papadinis as to the possible inapplicability of urban re-
development principles to non-slum land, the Court relied, in part, 
upon the opinion which the District Court wrote in Berman v. 
Parker.ll Ignored in the present opinion is the fact that the Supreme 
Court did not share the constitutional misgivings expressed by the 
lower court. In its opinion the Supreme Court said, referring to the 
plaintiff's contention that his property could not be taken against his 
will because it was not slum property: 
In the present case, Congress and its authorized agencies attack 
the problem of the blighted parts of the community on an area 
rather than on a structure-by-structure basis. . .. It was believed 
that the piecemeal approach, the removal of individual structures 
that were offensive, would be only a palliative. The entire area 
needed redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan could be 
developed for the region, including not only new homes but also 
schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping centers. In this 
way it was hoped that the cycle of decay of the area could be 
controlled and the birth of future slums prevented. . .. Such 
diversification in future use is plainly relevant to the mainte-
nance of the desired housing standards and therefore within con-
gressional power.12 
While there are undoubtedly factual distinctions which can be 
drawn between the urban redevelopment project in Berman v_ Parker 
and the Huntington Avenue Yard proposal, the basic difference be-
tween the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States and that 
of the Justices of the Massachusetts Court is a difference as to the 
proper content of the term "public purpose" as applied to a land tak-
ing. It is most interesting to observe that the Justices who, in JUly,13 
were willing to adapt the concept of police power to meet the social 
demands of the latter half of the twentieth century, did not feel, in 
May,14 a necessity of similarly adapting the concept of public pur-
pose.1S 
§11.8. Tenure of schoolteachers and the privilege against self-
incrimination. The House of Representatives requested an advisory 
10348 U.S. 26, 75 Sup. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27 (1954). 
11 Reported sub nom. Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 719 
et seq. (D.D.C. 1953). 
12 348 U.S. at 34-35, 75 Sup. Ct. at 103,99 L. Ed. at 38-39. 
13 Opinion of the Justices, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 823, 128 N.E.2d 557. 
14 Opinion of the Justices, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 541, 126 N.E.2d 795. 
15 A summary discussion of trends of constitutional doctrine with respect to legis· 
lation of the sort under discussion is to be found in an article by Professor Corwin W. 
Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 Law & Contemporary 
Problems 199 (1955). 
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opinion as to the validity of a proposed statute which would require 
discharge of any teacher at any college, university, teachers' college, or 
public or private school, who should refuse, at certain trials or duly 
constituted hearings for the investigation of communism, to testify as 
to his present or past membership in the Communist Party. Reading 
the question as referring to refusal to testify on the ground of the 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the Justices ruled 
that the bill would be unconstitutional,1 
Pointing out that both the federal 2 and the state3 Constitutions con-
tain privileges against self-incrimination, the Justices ruled that the 
practical working of a statute such as that proposed would require 
waiver of the privilege under one or the other Constitution as a condi-
tion of engaging in the occupation of teaching. Pointing out fur-
ther, with a number of citations, that both Constitutions secure to in-
dividuals the right to engage in lawful occupations, the Justices said 
that the proposed law would, in effect, allow the exercise of one con-
stitutional right at the price of sacrificing another. This, they ruled, 
was beyond the power of the legislature to do. 
Subsequently, the legislative proposal was modified, so as to be ap-
plicable only to teachers in public schools. In a second advisory opin-
ion4 the Justices ruled that the amended proposal would not violate 
the Constitutions, on the authority of Faxon v. School Committee of 
Boston.5 In that case, the Court ruled that discharge of a public 
school teacher for claiming privilege when questioned by a legislative 
committee with respect to communist connections did not violate his 
constitutional right of employment, since there is no constitutional 
right to be a public employee. 
The Justices recognized that the opinion may be subject to modifi-
cation, as the Supreme Court of the United States has under considera-
tion a case6 which presents the question whether a statute substantially 
similar to the proposal is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. 
After the advisory opinion was rendered, the proposal was passed by 
the House of Representatives, but was laid on the table in the Senate, 
and no further action was taken before the end of the legislative ses-
SIOn. 
§11.9. Police power: Public health regulation and dental advertis-
ing. A 1954 statu tel makes it unlawful for dental laboratories to 
advertise their services, techniques, or materials to the general public 
§1l.8. 1 Opinion of the Justices. 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 711, 127 N.E.2d 663. 
2 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. XII. 
3 U.S. Const., Amend. V. 
4 Opinion of the Justices, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 493. 126 N.E.2d 365. 
5331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954). This case was discussed in 1954 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §13.5. 
6 Daniman v. Board of Education. 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373 (1954), 307 N.Y. 
806. 121 N.E.2d 629 (1954), probable jurisdiction noted, sub nom. Slochower v. Board 
of Education. 348 U.S. 935. 75 Sup. Ct. 356. 99 L. Ed. 732 (1955). This case 
was carried over to October Term. 1955. as No. 23. It was argued October 19. 1955. 
§11.9. 1 C.L.. c. 112, §52C. 
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or to solicit the patronage of the general public., They may, however, 
advertise in professional and trade papers and in public telephone 
directories. 
The constitutional validity of the statute was drawn into question in 
Perlow v. Board of Dental Examiners.2 There, the proprietor of a 
dental laboratory contended that the statutory restrictions constituted 
an invasion of his constitutional right to seek outlets for his services 
and his products. He did not, so the argument ran, perform any of 
the functions which, by law, may be performed only by dentists. He 
did not, for example, fit dentures to a patient's mouth. He simply 
made them in compliance with specifications furnished by a registered 
dentist, and the finished product was fitted in the patient's mouth by 
the dentist. The statute, the argument concluded, unreasonably re-
stricts the access of the plaintiff, as a manufacturer, to a- lawful mar-
ket for his goods and services, and unlawfully discriminates against 
him by imposing upon him restrictions which are not imposed upon 
other manufacturers. 
The argument was rejected by the Court and the validity of the stat-
ute was sustained. The Court read the statute as auxiliary to the 
concededly valid statutesB which regulate dentists and restrict their ad-
vertising. The legislature may have felt, reasoned the Court, that ad-
vertising by dental laboratories might become a device for advertising 
by dentists who are customers of the laboratories. Or it may have felt 
that laboratory advertising might have a tendency to make the labo-
ratory the initial contact of a prospective dental patient, so that the 
laboratory might perform the function of "funneling" patients to 
dentists selected and recommended by it. 
The decision is in line with a judicial trend of sustaining legislation 
which impinges upon the field of public health. So long as there is a 
perceptible relation, no matter how attenuated, between the legisla-
tive regulation and a legitimate public health objective, the judicial 
disposition is to indulge the legislative discretion. This attitude was 
emphasized in a case4 argued to and decided by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the interval between the argument and the deci-
sion of the Perlow case. There the Supreme Court sustained an Okla-
homa statute which imposed some extremely rigorous restrictions 
upon opticians. Although the Court all but said that the justices 
personally thought some, at least, of the restrictions unnecessary, the 
decision was that, in matters of this sort, the legislature, not the courts, 
must be the judge of necessity. This case was cited in the Perlow 
opinion, but the same result would probably have been reached on 
the basis of the established law with respect to regulation of dentistry. 
2 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 649, 127 N.E.2d 306. 
B Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 55 Sup. Ct. 570, 
79 L. Ed. 1086 (1935). 
4 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U,S. 483, 75 Sup. Ct. 461, 99 L. Ed. 563 (1955). 
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